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Abstract 
There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise 
difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic 
induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners 
turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional 
pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false 
because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false. 
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1. Introduction 
Science is successful in explaining and predicting phenomena. Why is science successful? 
Putnam’s no-miracles argument (1975) says that science is successful because successful 
scientific theories are approximately true and their key terms refer. For example, the kinetic 
theory of heat, the germ theory of diseases, and the special theory of relativity are successful 
because they are approximately true and the theoretical entities they postulate exist. To say 
that a theory is successful entails that some of their observational consequences turned out to 
be true. It would be a miracle, Putnam says, if successful theories are not even approximately 
true, and if their key terms do not refer. Thus, approximate truth and reference generate the 
best explanation of the success of science. This explanation of the success of science is called 
the no-miracles argument. It is regarded as the best argument for scientific realism (‘realism’ 
from now on). 
In this paper, realism is defined as the position that a successful scientific theory is 
(approximately) true, and antirealism is defined as the view that a successful scientific theory 
is empirically adequate. On these definitions, realists believe both what science says about 
observables and unobservables, whereas antirealists believe only what science says about 
observables. For example, realists believe that molecules are real, and that heat phenomena 
occur, whereas antirealists are skeptical that molecules are real, but they believe that heat 
phenomena occur.  
The no-miracles argument received many criticisms from antirealists. One of them 
comes from the history of science that successful past theories, such as the caloric theory of 
heat, the humoral theory of medicine, and the ether theory, turned out to be false, so 
successful present theories, such as the kinetic theory of heat, the germ theory of diseases, 
and the special theory of relativity, will also turn out to be false as a matter of induction. I 
will call this historical objection the traditional pessimistic induction. The traditional 
pessimistic induction reflects the pessimistic inductions constructed by following eminent 
philosophers:  
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The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief  
period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after the other; he sees ruins piled upon  
ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn,  
and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160) 
 
Most of the past theories of science are already suspected of being false; there is presumably  
every reason to anticipate that current theories of science will suffer a similar fate. (Laudan  
1977: 126) 
 
..the following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly compelling: Just as no term used in  
the science of more than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term  
used now (except maybe observational terms, if there are such) refers. (Putnam, 1978: 25). 
 
Thus, the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a straightforward inductive rationale for  
thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by  
the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time. (Stanford, 2006: 20) 
 
The slight differences among these pessimistic inductions do not matter for the purpose of 
this paper because their main insight is captured by my simple formulation that since past 
theories turned out to be false, so will present theories. 
Throughout this paper I operate under the assumption that the traditional pessimistic 
induction is correct, exploring its devastating implications against antirealism. This paper is 
in stark contrast with other papers in the literature on the pessimistic induction. What is at 
stake in this paper is antirealism whereas in other papers it is realism. In the literature, 
antirealists run the pessimistic induction against realism. In response, realists criticize the 
pessimistic induction. Antirealists in turn defend the pessimistic induction and criticize the 
realist responses to it. This paper is intended to turn the dialectal terrain upside down, running 
the pessimistic induction against antirealism. It will become clear at the end of this paper that 
antirealists have every reason to fight the pessimistic induction just like realists. 
     Another line of objections to the no-miracles argument is predicated on the idea that 
there can be antirealist explanations not invoking approximate truth and reference. Those 
antirealist accounts undermine the realist contention that approximate truth and reference 
yield the best explanation of the success of science. I found nine such antirealist suggestions 
in the literature. In this paper, I will raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one 
(Lyons, 2003), and then construct a pessimistic induction against it. My pessimistic induction 
against it is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction against successful current 
scientific theories. 
 
2. Antirealist Explanations 
2.1. Evolutionary Explanation 
Van Fraassen (1980) argues that some current scientific theories are successful because 
successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die out: 
 
..I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not even surprising  
to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce  
competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive – the ones  
which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature. (1980: 40) 
 
The idea seems to be that scientists propose theories about the world. Some of them pass 
severe tests, explain a lot of phenomena, and accurately predict future phenomena. Others do 
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not. Scientists retain the former and discard the latter. Science is successful because scientists 
accept successful theories and reject unsuccessful ones. 
How do realists react to van Fraassen’s evolutionary explanation in the literature? 
Lipton (1991: 170ff.) and Psillos (1999: 96-97) argue that a full-fledged evolutionary 
explanation of the success of science would invoke approximate truth, just as a full-fledged 
evolutionary explanation of a phenotype invokes a genotype. Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
was combined with molecular biology in the second half of the 20
th
 century. As a result, 
genetic explanations can be given for why we have a certain observable property. Just as the 
evolutionary explanation of an observable property invokes genes, so should the evolutionary 
explanation of the success of science invoke approximate truth. 
Van Fraassen would, however, stick to his original position, arguing that what is 
minimally required to explain the success of science is not approximate truth but the survival 
and deaths of scientific theories, and that the principle of economy dictates us to choose the 
survival and deaths over approximate truth. Therefore, Lipton and Psillos’s response is not a 
knockdown argument against van Fraassen’s evolutionary explanation. 
My first response to van Fraassen’s evolutionary explanation is to point out that the 
successful past theories, such as the caloric theory of heat and the humoral theory of 
medicine, are all counterexamples to it. They were successful, but they all died out. Why did 
they die out when they were successful? It is not clear what the evolutionary answer would be. 
It appears that the evolutionary explanation can be applicable at best to the success of present 
theories, but not to the success of past theories. In fact, van Fraassen’s first sentence cited 
above suggests that he set out to explain only the success of current theories. 
A more serious problem with the evolutionary explanation is that it appeals to the 
successful current scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory. The traditional pessimistic 
induction implies that the evolutionary theory will be disclosed to be false like past theories. 
An explanation appealing to such a theory is ipso facto fated to be disclosed to be false. The 
evolutionary explanation appears to be true now, but in reality it is false, and it will turn out 
to be false.  
 
2.2. Robust Method 
Laudan claims that science is successful because scientific theories result from robust 
scientific methods: 
 
Science is successful, to the extent it is successful, because scientific theories result from a 
winnowing process which is arguably more robust and more discriminating than other 
techniques we have found for checking our empirical conjectures about the physical world. 
(1984: 101) 
 
Scientists use rigorous testing methods, such as double-blind experiments in which even 
researchers do not know whether a particular patient belongs to the control group or the 
testing group. If scientists do not use such robust methods, scientific theories would not be 
successful. 
The proffered explanation, however, has no explanatory force. Imagine that we are 
puzzled over why an apple falls down as opposed to hanging on the branch of a tree. An 
explanation is proposed that an apple falls down from a tree because Spinoza planted the tree 
in the past. We would not be satisfied with such an explanation because Spinoza’s act of 
planting the tree is equally responsible for an apple’s hanging on the branch of the tree. Thus, 
an event that is responsible for both an explanandum and an event that is in contrast with the 
4 
 
explanandum does not give rise to explanatory force. Citing such an explanatory factor is not 
illuminating. 
It is granted that the use of the robust method is a prior condition for a theory to be 
successful. But it is also a prior condition for a theory to be unsuccessful. Suppose that 
scientists use a robust method in an experiment, and that a theory fails the test. In such a case, 
the use of the robust method is a prior condition that contributed to the failure of the theory. 
After all, unless scientists had used the robust method, the theory would not have failed the 
test. Hence, using a robust method is equally responsible for a theory’s being unsuccessful. 
Thus, citing such a factor is not illuminating to those who wonder why a theory is successful 
as opposed to being unsuccessful. When realists ask why some scientific theories are 
successful, they want to know what properties successful theories have in common that 
unsuccessful theories do not have. 
Laudan might retort that successful theories are the ones that scientists accept, and that 
unsuccessful theories are the ones that scientists reject through using robust experimental 
methods, so some scientific theories are successful because scientists accept them. In my 
view, however, this explanation involves explaining an event in terms of another event 
posterior to it. After all, scientists accept a scientific theory by first observing that it makes 
true predictions and explains puzzling phenomena. It is wrong to explain an event in terms of 
another event posterior to it. Therefore, it is wrong to say that some scientific theories are 
successful because scientists accept them. We should rather say that scientists accept some 
theories because they are successful.  
 
2.3. Empirical Adequacy 
Musgrave and Ladyman suggest that antirealists could explain the success of a theory in 
terms of its empirical adequacy:  
 
Theory T is empirically adequate. 
Theory T yielded several novel predictions. 
Therefore, T’s novel predictions were true. (Musgrave, 1988: 242) 
 
So, for example, the antirealist may claim that the empirical adequacy of a theory explains  
its success and that is that. (Ladyman, 1999: 186) 
 
Put differently, a theory is successful because it is empirically adequate. This suggestion is 
similar to the suggestion that “some crows are black because all crows are” (Musgrave, 1988: 
242). After all, a theory is empirically adequate when all of its observational consequences 
are true, and to say that a theory is successful implies that some of its observational 
consequences are true.  
Leplin objects that empirical adequacy is a poor explanatory property for success 
because generalizations “do not explain their instances” (1997: 23). It is a vacuous 
explanation that some crows are black because all crows are black. Leplin also claims that 
empirical adequacy itself is what needs to be explained:  
 
However, as an explanation either of what is observed or of how a theory manages to predict  
what is observed, empirical adequacy is an attribute that itself cries out for explanation. (Leplin,  
1997: 23) 
 
Ladyman replies that Leplin’s claim “needs to be argued rather than merely stated…” (1999: 
186). In other words, antirealists might deny that empirical adequacy cries out for an 
5 
 
explanation, so Leplin needs to offer an argument to persuade antirealists of the need to 
explain empirical adequacy.  
Kukla (1996: S303-S305) makes a similar critical point, arguing that it is hard to justify 
stopping not at empirical adequacy but at approximate truth in the chain of demand for 
explanation. Success can be explained by empirical adequacy, and empirical adequacy can be 
explained by approximate truth. For antirealists, the demand for an explanation should stop at 
empirical adequacy, whereas for realists, it should stop at approximate truth. Antirealists 
challenge realists to justify the realist position that the demand for an explanation should stop 
at approximate truth. Therefore, Leplin’s response to the antirealist explanation is not a 
serious strike against it. 
My response to the antirealist proposal is to conjure up the traditional pessimistic 
induction. As Park (2001) and Lange (2002) point out, if the pessimistic induction is correct, 
both successful past and present scientific theories are empirically inadequate:  
 
The successful past theories turned out to be empirically inadequate. So successful current  
theories will turn out to be empirically inadequate as well. (Park, 2001: 78) 
 
Most of these theories eventually turned out not to be empirically adequate. Therefore, we  
should believe that probably, most of the theories we currently accept are not empirically  
adequate either. (Lange, 2002: 282) 
 
Successful past and present theories are all counterexamples to the suggestion that a theory is 
successful because it is empirically adequate. Consequently, empirical adequacy can explain 
neither the success of the past theories nor the success of the present theories.  
 
2.4. As-If-True 
Fine (1986) argues that an antirealist could explain the success of science in terms of the 
notion of as-if-true. The idea is that a scientific theory is successful because the world 
operates as if it were true, i.e., because the observable phenomena are as if the theory were 
true. The proposal is distinctively antirealistic because one need not believe that a theory 
invoked is true in order to explain its success. The as-if-true explanation is neutral as to 
whether the theory is true or false because the world may operate at the observational level as 
if it were true when in fact it is false. What is the explanation committed to, if not to the truth 
of the theory? Musgrave thinks that it is committed to the empirical adequacy of the theory:  
 
For the explanation to go through it must assert at least that the world is observationally as  
if T were true. If it asserts no more than this, then it is just a fancy way of saying that T is  
observationally or empirically adequate. (Musgrave, 1988: 243) 
 
In other words, there is only a verbal difference between the appeal to as-if-true and the 
appeal to empirical adequacy. Stanford concurs with Musgrave, saying that it is not clear that 
the appeal to as-if-true “is really any more than verbally distinct from the constructive 
empiricist’s appeal to empirical adequacy” (2000: 268). 
How do realists react to the antirealist proposal in the literature? Leplin argues that the 
explanans, as-if-true, cries out for an explanation, and that truth would explain it:  
 
Why does everything happen as if the theory is true? The theory’s truth would explain this, so 
it would seem a legitimate query. (Leplin, 1997: 25) 
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Stanford agrees with Leplin, saying that the operation of the world as if the theory were true 
“does indeed both cry out for some further explanation and invite the truth of the theory” 
(2000: 269). 
Both Leplin and Stanford might be right that the truth of a theory explains why the 
world operates as if the theory were true. Antirealists, however, would insist that no reason is 
given for stopping at truth in the chain of demand for an explanation. They would stop at the 
as-if-true explanation, requesting that realists justify the need to explain the explanans of the 
as-if-true explanation. Therefore, Leplin and Stanford’s response does not amount to a 
refutation of the as-if-true explanation. 
My response to the as-if-true explanation is to advance the traditional pessimistic 
induction against it. The pessimistic induction asserts that successful past and present theories 
are all empirically inadequate. To say that a successful theory is empirically inadequate 
means that not all observable phenomena are as if it were true. Hence, it is wrong to say that 
“the explanation of the success of a theory consists in the operation of observable phenomena 
as if the theory were true” (Park, 2001: 87).  
 
2.5. Usefulness 
Fine (1991) argues that antirealists could explain the success of science in terms of 
instrumental reliability. A scientific theory is successful because it is instrumentally reliable. 
He claims that a theory is instrumentally reliable just in case it is useful: 
 
Hence being reliable amounts to no more than being useful for getting things to work (or work 
out). (Fine, 1991: 95)  
 
In a nutshell, a scientific theory is successful because it is useful. Fine (1991: 82) also claims 
that the instrumental explanation is better than the realist explanation because instrumental 
reliability is what is minimally required to explain the success of science. To put differently, 
the principle of economy favors instrumental reliability over approximate truth as an 
explanatory property for success.  
What do realists say about Fine’s proposal in the literature? Psillos argues that 
approximate truth is what enables a theory to be instrumentally reliable:  
 
..the property of being approximately true would ground the power of scientific theories to be  
instrumentally reliable. (1999: 93) 
 
Since approximate truth grounds instrumental reliability, we can explain instrumental 
reliability in terms of approximate truth. In other words, we can say that a theory is 
instrumentally reliable because it is approximately true. 
In my view, to explain success in terms of instrumental reliability or usefulness is to 
put the cart in front of the horse, i.e., the explanans and the explanandum should switch their 
places. Suppose, for instance, that an astronomical theory makes true predictions, thereby 
helping us to cope with future natural disasters. Obviously, the theory is useful. Notice that 
the theory gets to be useful by means of being successful. After all, it helps us to cope with 
future catastrophes by means of making true predictions. Thus, success is what grounds 
usefulness. It follows that usefulness should be explained in terms of success, not the other 
way around. In other words, instead of saying that a theory is successful because it is useful, 
we should rather say that a theory is useful because it is successful. Fine’s proposal has a 
conceptual flaw. 
 
2.6. Narrative Explanation 
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Brown (1994) proposes an explanation of the success of science which he takes to be an 
alternative to Putnam’s realist explanation. The style of the explanation, he argues, is 
narrative. On the narrative style, an explanandum is explained by a story which depicts a 
series of past events leading to the explanandum. Brown’s example of narrative explanation 
is an evolutionary explanation of a biological property of current organisms. In an 
evolutionary explanation, a biological property is explained by a story of what happened in 
the past. What is crucial on the narrative style of explanation is that an explainer does not 
have to be confident of the truth of the narrative:  
 
Is this meant by the evolutionist to be true? Not with any degree of confidence. It is 
only meant to be an evolutionary possibility, one of the many courses (within the 
Darwinian framework) that nature might have taken. (Brown, 1994: 21) 
 
We can explain a biological property in terms of an evolutionary narrative, even if we are not 
confident at all that the evolutionary narrative is true. Likewise, we can explain the success of 
theories in terms of their (approximate) truth, although “we cannot count on the (approximate) 
truth of the theories at all” (Brown, 1994: 25). So “the realist has an explanation of the 
success of science: truth is the explanation and the style of the explanation is narrative” 
(Brown, 1994: 23). Brown takes the narrative explanation of the success of science to be 
realistic on the grounds that truth is invoked.  
It seems, however, that Brown’s explanation of the success of science is not realistic 
but antirealistic. After all, what is crucial on Brown’s account is that the explainer does not 
have to be committed to the truth of the explanans. If so, how can his account be realistic? 
The fundamental difference between realism and antirealism is that realism is committed to 
theoretical truths, and antirealism only to observational truths (Psillos, 1999: xx). It follows 
that Brown’s proposal is distinctively antirealistic. 
In my view, Brown’s proposal involves Moore’s Paradox. Moore (1993: 207-212) 
observes that a paradox arises when we utter a sentence of the form: p, but I do not believe 
that p. For example, Moore’s Paradox arises when you say, “Only the fittest tend to survive, 
but I don’t believe that only the fittest tend to survive.” If you do not believe that only the 
fittest tend to survive, how can you say, “Only the fittest tend to survive”? When you say, 
“Only the fittest tend to survive,” you are expressing your belief that only the fittest tend to 
survive. Thus, if you say afterwards, “But I don’t believe that only the fittest tend to survive,” 
you are contradicting yourself, i.e., you are negating what you just affirmed. 
Moore’s observation on the speech act goes hand in hand with the general practice of 
scholarly journals. Scholarly journals have stylistic guidelines for their prospective authors. 
One of them holds that authors should refrain from using the expression ‘I believe.’ Authors 
should say, for example, “Only the fittest tend to survive” instead of “I believe that only the 
fittest tend to survive.” The rationale behind this stylistic guideline is that if authors state 
“Only the fittest tend to survive,” readers assume that the authors believe that only the fittest 
tend to survive, so it is superfluous to add ‘I believe.’ To sum up, the utterance of p involves 
the belief that p. 
Similarly, when we say “A theory is successful because it is true,” we are expressing 
our belief that the successful theory is true. We are contradicting ourselves, if we say 
afterwards, “But I don’t believe the successful theory is true.” To generalize, when we 
explain an explanandum in terms of an explanans, we are expressing the belief that the 
explanans is true. If we do not believe that the explanans is true, we cannot use the explanans 
to explain the explanandum. Therefore, we ought to be committed to truth, if we invoke it to 
explain success, pace Brown. 
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2.7. Approximate Empirical Adequacy 
Kukla (1996) introduces an interesting antirealist notion: approximate empirical adequacy. 
What does it mean to say that a theory is approximately empirically adequate? Kukla gives a 
provisional definition, and Park develops it as follows: 
 
I provisionally define “T is (approximately) empirically adequate” as “T is (approximately)  
empirically equivalent to a true theory.” (Kukla, 1996: S300)  
 
I propose that a theory is approximately empirically adequate just in case most of its  
observational consequences are true. (Park, 2009: 117, footnote) 
 
Antirealists could suggest that a scientific theory is successful because it is approximately 
empirically adequate. The suggestion is compatible with the traditional pessimistic induction. 
Thus, approximate empirical adequacy seems to be the right semantic property for antirealists. 
In my view, however, the antirealist explanation is vacuous. To say that a theory is 
successful because it is approximately empirically adequate would be like saying that some 
crows are black because most crows are black. What is wrong with such explanations? 
Imagine that in the world there are five crows: c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5. All of them are black 
except the last one, c5, which is white. Consider the following exchange between a realist and 
an antirealist:  
 
Realist: Why are some crows black? Why are, say c1 and c2, black?  
Antirealist: They are black because most crows are black, i.e., because c1, c2, c3, and c4  
are black.  
Realist: Why are c3 and c4 black?  
Antirealist: They are black because most crows are black, i.e., because c1, c2, c3, and c4  
are black.  
 
In a nutshell, the antirealist claims that c1 and c2 are black because c3 and c4 are black, and 
that c3 and c4 are black because c1 and c2 are black. Such explanations are circular, casting no 
light on why c1 and c2 are black, or why c3 and c4 are black.  
Analogously, the problem of circularity arises when antirealists say that a theory is 
successful because it is approximately empirically adequate. Suppose that a theory has five 
observational consequences: o1, o2, o3, o4, and o5. All the observational consequences except 
the last one, o5, are true, so the theory is approximately empirically adequate. Imagine the 
following dialogue between a realist and an antirealist:  
 
Realist: Why is the theory successful? Why are, say o1 and o2, true?  
Antirealist: They are true because most of the observational consequences are true, i.e.,  
because o1, o2, o3, and o4 are true.  
Realist: Why are o3 and o4 true?  
Antirealist: They are true because o1, o2, o3, and o4 are true. 
 
In effect, the antirealist claims that o1 and o2 are true because o3 and o4 are true, and that o3 
and o4 are black because o1 and o2 are true. Such explanations are circular. To sum up, it 
sounds acceptable that a theory is successful because it is approximately empirically adequate. 
On close examination, however, it is not. 
 
2.8. Predictive Similarity 
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Stanford contends that a scientific theory is successful because its predictions are similar to 
those of its corresponding true theory. For example, the Ptolemaic theory was successful 
because its predictions were similar to those of the Copernican theory: 
 
..the success of a given false theory in a particular domain is explained by the fact that its 
predictions are (sufficiently) close to those made by the true theoretical account of the relevant 
domain. (Stanford, 2000: 275) 
 
Stanford’s proposal is antirealistic because we do not need to believe the content of a true 
theory in order to explain the success of its corresponding false theory. He emphasizes this 
point as follows: 
 
Notice that the actual content of the Copernican hypothesis plays no role whatsoever in the  
explanation we get of the success of the Ptolemaic system: what matters is simply that there  
is some true theoretical account of the domain in question and that the predictions of the  
Ptolemaic system are sufficiently close to the predictions made by that true theoretical  
account. (Stanford, 2000: 274) 
 
Thus, an antirealist can explain the success of science without believing that any current 
scientific theory is true. 
Park (2003) criticizes Stanford’s proposal in detail. I can only summarize his main 
criticism here. Imagine that a tennis ball is in front of you. Why is the tennis ball spherical? 
One proposes that the tennis ball is spherical because it is similar to a baseball with respect to 
shape. You would think that the explanation is unacceptable. Why is it unacceptable? It is 
unacceptable because the tennis ball’s property of being spherical is what grounds the 
similarity between the tennis ball and the baseball. The tennis ball is similar to the baseball 
with respect to shape because the tennis ball is spherical, not the other way around. Thus, if X 
grounds Y, Y should be explained in terms of X, not the other way around. We can apply this 
principle to Stanford’s proposal.  
We need to determine whether predictive similarity grounds success or success 
grounds predictive similarity. What makes a given theory predictively similar to its true 
theory is that the given theory is approximately empirically adequate, i.e., most of its 
observational consequences are true. If most of its observational consequences are false, it 
would not be predictively similar to the true theory at all. If all of its observational 
consequences are true, it would be predictively identical with, rather than similar to, the true 
theory. Thus, the truths of the most of the observational consequences are what ground the 
predictive similarity.  
To say that a theory is successful entails that some of its observational consequences 
are true. It follows that success partially grounds predictive similarity, and hence to say that a 
theory is successful because it is predictively similar to its true theory is analogous to saying 
that a tennis ball is spherical because it is similar to a baseball with respect to shape. It is for 
this reason that Park concludes that it is conceptually problematic “to explain success in 
terms of observational similarity” (2003: 167-168).  
 
2.9. Almost As-If-True 
Let me move on to the latest antirealist explanation of success. Lyons (2003) contends that a 
theory is successful because its theoretical mechanisms would generate almost the same 
phenomena as actual mechanisms:  
 
The mechanisms postulated by the theory and its auxiliaries would, if actual, bring about all  
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relevant phenomena thus far observed and some yet to be observed at time t; and these  
phenomena are brought about by actual mechanisms in the world. (Lyons, 2003: 900) 
 
In simple terms, a theory is successful because the world operates almost as if the theory 
were true. Lyons’s account does not say that all of the observational consequences of a theory 
are true. It rather says that some of them are false. Therefore, it is compatible with the 
pessimistic induction that past and present theories are all empirically inadequate. Should we 
accept Lyons’s proposal?  
 
3. Pessimistic Induction 
It appears that Lyons’s proposal does not have problems, but in reality it has, and they will be 
exposed in the future. Its eight forerunners were disclosed to be problematic, so it will also be 
unveiled to be problematic. We do not even have to know exactly what Lyons’s explanation 
says. All we need to know is the historical fact that its antecedents were disclosed to be 
problematic. This pessimistic induction against Lyons’s proposal mirrors the traditional 
pessimistic induction against current scientific theories that they appear to be true now, but in 
reality they are false, and they will turn out to be false in the future. We do not have to know 
about the content of a current scientific theory and the experimental evidence for it. All we 
need to know is the historical fact that its antecedents were revealed to be false. 
Antirealists may argue that philosophical theories do not fall prey to a pessimistic 
induction while scientific theories do, bringing up differences between philosophical and 
scientific theories. The differences are that philosophical theories are about science whereas 
scientific theories are about the world, and hence philosophical theories are indirectly 
connected with observations, whereas scientific theories are directly connected with 
observations. It follows that philosophical theories are immune to a pessimistic induction, but 
scientific theories are not. 
In my view, driving a wedge between philosophical and scientific theories does not 
necessarily help philosophical theories. After all, philosophical theories might be more 
vulnerable to a pessimistic induction than scientific theories simply because philosophical 
theories are indirectly connected with observations while scientific theories are directly 
connected with observations. After all, the history of science tells us that observational data 
are relatively stable while scientific theories come and go. Thus, the tenuous connection of 
philosophical theories with observations might be detrimental rather than helpful to 
philosophical theories.  
Besides, we have reason for thinking that Lyons’s proposal is more susceptible to a 
pessimistic induction than a current scientific theory, e.g., the kinetic theory of heat. Lyons’s 
proposal has eight problematic predecessors whereas the kinetic theory of heat has only one 
false forerunner, viz., the caloric theory of heat. Eight instances constitute a more powerful 
inductive rationale than one instance. Antirealist philosophical theories of the success of 
science come and go more frequently than scientific theories of heat do, which shows that the 
philosophical theories are epistemically more unstable than the scientific theories. 
Antirealists may reply that all the successful past scientific theories jointly constitute 
the inductive basis against the kinetic theory of heat, so the Ptolemaic theory, the humoral 
theory of medicine, the ether theory, and so on form the inductive basis against the kinetic 
theory of heat. In contrast, only the eight antirealist explanations constitute the inductive 
basis against Lyons’s explanation. The sample size against the kinetic theory of heat is much 
larger than the sample size against Lyons’s account. Therefore, the traditional pessimistic 
induction against the kinetic theory of heat is much stronger than my pessimistic induction 
against Lyons’s proposal. 
11 
 
My reply is that if antirealists include in their sample all the extant scientific theories 
that are not related to heat phenomena with the view to refuting the kinetic theory of heat, I 
do not see why it is wrong to include in my sample all the extant philosophical theories, such 
as Plato’s theory of Forms and Descartes’s substance dualism, that are not related to the 
success of science with the view to refuting Lyons’s explanation of the success of science. 
All those old philosophical theories jointly poison Lyons’s account, just as all the old 
scientific theories jointly poison the kinetic theory of heat. Consequentially, Lyons’s theory is 
epistemically no better off than the kinetic theory of heat. 
Furthermore, both philosophical and scientific theories are the products of the same 
kind of rule of inference, viz., inference to the best explanation. Van Fraassen, for instance, 
explicitly claims that both scientists and philosophers use inference to the best explanation to 
arrive at their theories:  
 
     The inference from the phenomena that puzzle us, to their best explanation, appears to have  
our instinctive assent. We see putative examples of it, in science and philosophy no less  
than in ordinary life and in literature. (van Fraassen, 1989: 131)  
 
In a similar vein, Laudan claims that there is no methodological difference between science 
and philosophy in that both philosophical and scientific theories are subject to empirical tests:  
 
     A growing number of philosophers (including Boyd, Newton-Smith, Shimony, Putnam,  
Friedman and Niiniluoto) have argued that the theses of epistemic realism are open to  
empirical test. The suggestion that epistemological doctrines have much the same empirical  
status as the sciences is a welcome one. (Laudan, 1981: 19) 
 
Given that theories, philosophical or scientific, are products of the same method, viz., 
inference to the best explanation, it is wrong to say that a pessimistic induction refutes 
scientific theories, but not antirealists’ philosophical theories.  
     Antirealists might run reductio ad absurdum against my pessimistic induction. If my 
pessimistic induction is correct, there would be no need to come up with a new antirealist 
explanation because it will turn out to be problematic. One may generalize that there would 
be no need to come up with a new idea in any area of human endeavor because the new idea, 
whatever it might be, will be disclosed to be problematic. This logical consequence of my 
pessimistic induction is absurd. Therefore, my pessimistic induction is absurd.  
My response to the foregoing objection is to argue that the alleged absurd consequence 
of my pessimistic induction might not be absurd. Antirealists would someday arrive at an 
unproblematic antirealist explanation, if past antirealist explanations have been improving 
upon their predecessors, and if future antirealist explanations also improve upon their 
forerunners. It is not clear, however, that there has been any improvement from van 
Fraassen’s explanation (1980) to Stanford’s explanation (2000). After all, it is neither the 
case that the scope of the past antirealist explanations has been increasingly widening, nor the 
case that the problems with the past antirealist explanations have been increasingly less 
serious. In the absence of such improvements, we have an inductive rationale for thinking 
that a future antirealist explanation will be no better than its antecedents. 
     In contrast, scientific theories have been improving upon their forerunners. As Devitt 
(2011: 292) and Park (2011: 80) point out, present theories are more successful than past 
theories. For example, the germ theory of diseases has a broader scope than the humoral 
theory of medicine, and the kinetic theory of heat explains more phenomena than the caloric 
theory of heat. Two pieces of cold metal become hot, when rubbed at a high speed. This heat 
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phenomenon can be explained by the kinetic theory of heat, but not by the caloric theory of 
heat (Hung, 1997: 83). Therefore, there is a need for scientists to come up with new scientific 
theories.  
 
4. Conclusion 
After criticizing eight antirealist explanations of the success of science, I constructed a 
pessimistic induction that the latest antirealist explanation, Lyons’s proposal, will turn out to 
be problematic because its eight antecedents turned out to be problematic. My pessimistic 
induction against Lyons’s proposal is on the same boat as the traditional pessimistic induction 
against successful present scientific theories that they will be revealed to be false because 
successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false. The two inductions rise or fall 
together. There is no reason for thinking that philosophical theories are resistant to a 
pessimistic induction while scientific theories are vulnerable to it. 
An interesting consequence follows from the equal status of the two pessimistic 
inductions. All the criticisms that the readers of this paper will raise against my pessimistic 
induction will equally apply to the traditional pessimistic induction. For example, antirealists 
may argue that unlike the past antirealist explanations, Lyons’s explanation is unproblematic, 
and it will not turn out to be problematic. This antirealist position presupposes that the future 
will differ from the past, whereas my pessimistic induction presupposes that the future will 
resemble the past. On the new antirealist account, the presupposition of my pessimistic 
induction is false. My reply to this possible antirealist position is to point out that the 
traditional pessimistic induction also presupposes that the future will resemble the past, and 
that the presupposition of the traditional pessimistic induction is also false, so unlike 
successful past scientific theories, successful present scientific theories are true, and they will 
not be disclosed to be false. In any event, it falls outside the range of this paper to take issue 
with the traditional pessimistic induction. This paper has the modest aim of showing that the 
pessimistic induction has devastating consequences on antirealism.  
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